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COOPER V AARON: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE LITIGATION

Judith Kilpatrick*
When Brown v. Board of Education' was decided on May 17, 1954,
Wiley A. Branton was a sole practitioner in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. He also
was president of the Pine Bluff Chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. He was also chair of the Legal Redress
Committee for the Arkansas State Conference of the NAACP.2
Branton and his colleague, George Howard, Jr., scheduled a meeting on
August 6 to explain the Brown decision to Pine Bluff's black community.
Similar meetings were held across the state. The Legal Redress Committee
began working with parents in various communities, including Little Rock,
to prepare petitions requesting admission of their children to white schools.3
Branton and other members of the committee met with the Little Rock
School Board on September 9, 1954, to present the petition and to offer their
help in implementing desegregation. They were told that studies would have
to be performed before any changes would be made. Their offer of help was
ignored.4
On May 24, 1955, the School District published a plan for desegregation developed by Superintendent Virgil Blossom. Instead of providing for
full desegregation of all schools in the district, it stated that only one high
school-Central-would be integrated.
Instead of admitting all black students living in the school's geographic
boundaries, school officials required potential students to apply and survive
a screening process before some of them would be admitted.' Over that
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summer, Blossom spoke with over a hundred white groups, emphasizing
that this plan was the least the District could do and remain within the law.6
In late July 1955, the Little Rock NAACP publicly protested the limited nature of the plan and its failure to set a date by which other schools
would be desegregated. When there was no response to its protest, the Little
Rock chapter voted to file a lawsuit against the School Board.7
Wiley Branton was asked to handle the case and filed a complaint on
February 8, 1956.8 The complaint was based on a model developed by the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (LDEF) for the purpose of
implementing the Brown decision. Branton and the LDEF lawyers all signed
as lawyers for the plaintiffs.9
The case went to trial on August 15 before the Honorable John E. Miller, judge of the United States District Court in Fort Smith, who decided the
School Board's plan was a reasonable response to Brown. Branton and the
NAACP immediately filed an appeal with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis, Missouri, which set a hearing for March 11, 1957.10 By
the time of the hearing, the NAACP had recognized the importance of the
case. Attorney Robert Carter from the NAACP's New York office shared
the presentation with Branton. They lost again.
At this point, the September 1957 date for the limited integration of
Central High School was looming. Branton and his clients decided not to
appeal their case further. Instead, they waited to see how the School District's plan would be implemented." This ended phase one of Aaron v.
Cooper. If the District had proceeded with its plan and dealt summarily with
the increasingly vocal and violent segregationists objecting to any integration, we might never have heard of Branton again.
Instead, on September 2, Governor Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to prevent entry by the Little Rock Nine (the only black students to survive the screening process and demonstrate the courage to stand
up to the segregationists). Angry mobs protested in the streets. The District
petitioned the court, asking what it should do.
A newly-assigned federal judge, the Honorable Ronald N. Davies from
Fargo, North Dakota, held a hearing the evening of September 3 and ordered
that the plan move forward. The students were prevented from entering Central High on September 4. A second request from the School Board to sus-
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pend its plan was made on September 5. It was denied after a hearing on
September 7.
It was during this period that Branton realized he needed help and
asked Thurgood Marshall to join him in the fight. Branton and Marshall,
who was Director-General of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., spent long days dealing with the court over the next two weeks,
trying to get the Nine into school and to keep them there.
Branton later recalled that during the September 1957 crisis, "we were
either in court or in conference with people from the Justice Department and
others for 30-some-odd consecutive days, and meeting on all kinds of legal
situations, from the state court to the federal court."'"
With favorable decisions from Judge Davies, including one on September 20 ordering Governor Faubus and the National Guard not to interfere
with entry of the students, Branton and Marshall succeeded. The students
entered the school on September 23, but they were evacuated when local
police could not maintain control over the mob outside the building. The
students finally entered Central and stayed after President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the 101 st Airborne to Little Rock to protect them. Even after
that, angry mobs made the black students' lives hell-both outside and inside the school. 3 This ended the second phase of Aaron v. Cooper.
In January 1958, the School District again requested the federal court's
permission to suspend its integration plan, citing the adverse treatment of
the black students by some white students and arguing that the presence of
the black students in the school made it impossible to provide an education
to all students.' 4 The Board's lawyers suggested that Brown only required
that the school district "comply with the constitutional mandate to enact a
plan 'at the earliest practicable date,"' which had been done. A delay would
not violate the law.
Under law, the "doctrine of impossibility" requires proof of two things:
(1) that unforeseeable circumstances justified modifying the Order to proceed with integration, and (2) that it was impossible for the Board to proceed with its plan. The circumstances the Board cited as unforeseeable were
"the harassment incidents against the Black students inside the school, the
presence of soldiers inside and mobs outside the school, and laws passed by
the state legislature in an effort to nullify Brown. These had 'made it difficult for teachers to teach and pupils to learn.""' 5
The Board asked for a delay of two-and-a-half years in implementing
the desegregation plan. They never stated what they expected to happen
12.
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during that period to change the situation, although questioning of Wayne
Upton, attorney and president of the School Board, indicated that the Board
itself did not intend to do anything and was just hoping that Faubus would
not be re-elected. 6 The Board's lawyers had to know their arguments were
weak and overshadowed by the plaintiffs' position.
The Supreme Court's opinion had stated that "these unconstitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with
them." 7 Branton and Marshall used that language to refute the Board's
stated concern about the harassment. They also said performance was not
impossible, since the Board could request the Court's help via an injunction
against the segregationists, as the Hoxie, Arkansas, School Board had done.
The plaintiffs' lawyers acknowledged that the School Board faced big
problems, but they argued that the problems did not relieve the Board of its
constitutional duty to follow through on its plan. "Such a 'surrender,' they
said, would 'thwart the Constitution of the United States and the orders of
this Court,' leading to anarchy. And, 'such action would effectively deny
plaintiffs and the class they represent 8constitutional rights heretofore recognized and guaranteed by this Court.""1
After hearing arguments on June 3, the Honorable Harry T. Leniley
granted the School District a two-and-one-half year suspension of the integration plan. Lemley defended his decision to newspaper reporters by saying
integration was "counter to the pattern of Southern life."' 9
Branton and Marshall immediately appealed Lemley's decision to both
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
Judge Lemley had refused to stay his Order, preventing its effect until the
appeal was heard. Little Rock students would be returning to a re-segregated
system in the fall unless one of the higher courts overruled Lemley's decision.2"
The Supreme Court refused to take the case directly from the District
Court but hinted to the Court of Appeals that it should grant an early hearing. 2' The Court of Appeals responded, setting a hearing date of August 4.
At that hearing, Branton and Marshall argued that confirming Lemley's decision would support mob rule, punishing the black students who had been
the victims of harassment. The School Board repeated its arguments at the
district court. The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued its
decision overturning Lemley's order two weeks after the hearing.
16.
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In its opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed that Brown did not require
an identical desegregation plan from every school district. The Court had
allowed local school districts to tailor implementation of desegregation to
local obstacles. The appellate court, however, noted "that the actions listed
by the School Board and cited in Lemley's decision 'were the direct result
of popular opposition to the presence of the22 nine Negro students.' Thus, the
situation was squarely covered by Brown."
The chief judge for the Court of Appeals, Archibald K. Gardner, who
was the only dissenter from that decision, granted a stay of the appellate
decision. That meant that Lemley's order remained in effect and, unless the
Supreme Court acted very quickly, the Little Rock system would be segregated in the fall.23
This time, it was the School District that filed an appeal. A hearing before the Supreme Court was scheduled for September 11. In anticipation of
an adverse decision, Governor Faubus asked the legislature to enact a number of laws that gave him control over the school system. He was prepared
to close Little Rock schools and allow them to reopen as private schools, if
the Supreme Court required the desegregation plan to continue.24
Hard questions were put to the School District's lawyer, Richard C.
Butler, by the members of the Supreme Court. In response, Butler argued
that it was preferable to deny constitutional rights to a few students in order
to provide "full educational opportunities" to the many. He also admitted
that the School District had no plans to change the situation for the better
during any delay it received. He spoke of the School Board being "caught
between two disputing 'sovereignties."' 25
The Court's decision affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of Judge
Lemley's order was announced the next day. In it, the Court noted that the
School Board, as "an agent of the State," violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution if it failed to provide "equal protection of the laws."
The public's
confusion or ignorance of the law did not relieve the state agent
26
of its duty.
The School Board's attorney, Richard Butler, walked a fine line during
his argument. Trying not to place blame on Faubus or the legislature, he
came close to denying the supremacy of federal law in this area. When challenged by the Court, he backed down.
Faubus might have thrown up his hands and accepted the pronouncement. Instead, he closed the Little Rock high schools and scheduled a spe22.
23.
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cial election for September 27, at which the voters would state whether or
not they favored integration.
In the meantime, he began negotiations to turn the high schools and the
teachers over to a private corporation that would operate the schools on a
segregated basis. Branton and Marshall asked the district court, where Judge
Miller again was presiding over the case, for an order to prevent the transfer
of property to the corporation. By the time the hearing on that request occurred, the School District announced it had signed a contract to transfer the
buildings to the private corporation. 7
Branton and Marshall immediately appealed to the Eighth Circuit, asking that the lease be declared void and without legal effect. While this hearing was in session on September 29, the Supreme Court's written opinion
confirming its oral decision earlier in the month was delivered.
The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. The high schools remained closed. Additional hearings in the Court of
Appeals on October 6 and 15 resulted in an order to Judge Miller, requiring
him to "'take such affirmative steps' as were needed to accomplish integration." 28
One would have thought that this ended the dispute. It did not. Judge
Miller did not respond until January 9, 1959, at which time he gave the District another ninety days to tell him what it intended to do to comply with
the Supreme Court's decision. 29 By January, the board that had guided the
School District for the duration of the case had resigned, and a new board,
consisting half of moderates and half of segregationists, was in place.
The judge had come up with another way to evade the Court of Appeals order. He interpreted the order as not requiring him to act affirmatively
to force the reopening of the schools, but requiring only that, if the schools
were reopened, it be on an integrated basis.30
Two weeks later, the new board asked to reopen the schools on a segregated basis; the judge refused pennission. It was as if the past year had
not occurred and no Supreme Court decision applied. Frustrated, Branton
and Marshall decided to attack the laws that had given Faubus power to control the schools.3
After almost a year's work, the United States Supreme Court found
those laws unconstitutional. By that time, however, several white groups had
formed to work toward reopening of the high schools. Working on public
opinion, they convinced voters to elect a new school board in May 1959,
27.
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composed of moderates who promised to get the schools opened for the fall
semester.
Attitudes to desegregation had not changed. There was recognition,
however, that if citizens wanted high schools, those high schools would
have to be integrated to some extent.32
In a reprise of the School Board's efforts in 1957, the screening of eligible black students resulted in only ten being admitted at two white high
schools. None of them had been members of the Nine. Again, the plaintiffs
had to appeal from a decision by Judge Miller that the school board was
acting in good faith. Although incremental gains were made over the succeeding years, the issue was never resolved finally.
Branton remained with the case as a consultant for the rest of his life,
in 1962
but he turned primary responsibility for it over to another lawyer
33
when he went to Georgia to direct the Voter Education Project.
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